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1 INTRODUCTION
The conclusion of the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free 
Trade Area (AfCFTA)1 is in stark contrast to the uncertainty and current 
retreat from multilateralism. The AfCFTA is a mega-regional trade agreement 
that aims to create a single market for goods and services, and to facilitate 
investment and the movement of persons in order to deepen economic 
integration in Africa. The AfCFTA seeks to accelerate intra-African trade and 
elevate Africa’s international economic relations in the multilateral trading 
regime. In this regard, the AfCFTA represents a pan-African vision that aims 
to unite African states as a regional trading bloc. The bloc is supposed to 
strategically deploy its strength in international trade negotiations by creating 
a competitive African market. At a time when confidence in the multilateral 
trading regime is waning, with trade wars in some regions, African states, 
perhaps more than ever, are embracing multilateralism.2
Beyond the symbolic power of the AfCFTA, scholars have raised concerns 
about the extent to which the AfCFTA truly engenders a fair, equitable and 
radically different future for Africa.3 Since colonisation, African states have 
devolved into a hodgepodge of highly stratified economies with widening 
inequalities. The deep-seated structural and socio-economic inequality and 
power asymmetry among African states have most recently been revealed by 
1 Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area, in force 30 May 2019 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated_text_on_cfta_-_
en.pdf (AfCFTA).
2 See Chapter 5 on decision making. 
3 See generally Obeng‐Odom F ‘The African Continental Free Trade Area’ (2020) 79 
(1) American Journal of Economics and Sociology 167–197; and Ajibo C ‘African 
Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: The Euphoria, Pitfalls and Prospects’ (2019) 
53 (5) Journal of World Trade 871–894. 
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the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the long history of sub-regional economic 
cooperation in Africa, vulnerabilities in Africa’s trade regimes persist.4 The 
new institutions of the AfCFTA will be nestled in a complex regime of sub-
regional economic communities (RECs) mostly reputed for their non-economic 
agenda. It follows that below optimal performance of the institutions of 
the RECs presents a unique challenge for the AfCFTA’s aspirations. Since 
the AfCFTA increases the density of the fragmented sub-regional economic 
institutions in Africa, it assumes even greater importance when examined in 
the context of the many previous efforts among African states that have simply 
failed. The failure of the past continental integration initiatives, as well as 
the precarious struggle of the regional economic integration schemes to make 
any meaningful economic impact, is a cause for concern vis-à-vis the rhetoric 
of success that the conclusion of the AfCFTA has garnered. Regionally, the 
eventual implementation of the AfCFTA will be embedded in a complex 
regime of RECs and systemic deficiencies that have crippled the capacity of 
African regional trade agreements to thrive economically. These dynamics and 
the paradigm of trade alliances that emerge from them are important factors 
with meaningful implications for the future of the AfCFTA.
Despite Africa’s fragmented sub-regional economic regimes, the AfCFTA 
represents a significant moment for African states to harness the continent’s 
international trade and investment opportunities on their own terms. 
The AfCFTA initiates a set of complex and lengthy negotiations with a 
view to reducing tariffs, galvanising industrial production, and boosting 
Africa’s trade. The success of Africa’s reinvigorated liberal internationalism 
embodied in the AfCFTA depends on a host of factors that primarily include 
its effective implementation. 
In this chapter, I situate the AfCFTA in the historical and contemporary 
contexts of the mixed performance of RECs and other regimes in which its 
implementation will be embedded. I also examine the pre-existing structural 
deficiencies that the COVID-19 pandemic has brought to the fore and their 
implications for the AfCFTA. Building on the foregoing, I further critically 
4 For a discussion of such vulnerabilities, see Akinkugbe OD & Gammage C 
‘Symposium Introduction: Vulnerabilities in the Trade and Investment Regimes in 
the Age of COVID-19’ (18 August 2020) Afronomicslaw Blog Symposium https://
www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/08/18/symposium-introduction-vulnerabilities-in-
the-trade-and-investment-regimes-in-the-age-of-covid-19/. The theme is discussed on 
greater details in the forthcoming second issue of the African Journal of International 
Economic Law (AfJIEL).
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examine the blind-spots of the pan-Africanist aspirations of the AfCFTA for 
the future of the trade regime in Africa. Following this introduction, in the 
second section, I examine the substantive provisions of the AfCFTA and its 
institutions, focusing on the question of supranationality in the decision-making 
process. In the third section, I deepen the chapter’s analysis by examining the 
promise of the AfCFTA in the shadow of Africa’s mixed record of economic 
cooperation. In the fourth section, I examine the systemic deficiencies in 
African regional trade regimes, as impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. To 
illustrate the latter, I draw on the finance sector-debt burden conundrum and 
digitalisation. I selected the examples to illustrate areas where deep-seated 
historical challenges exist and sectors emerge that African leaders should 
capitalise upon for a better post-pandemic Africa. In the penultimate section, 
I contend that a critical understanding of pan-Africanism in a morphological 
sense that acknowledges its shortcomings is important to understanding the 
attitude of African states to the lethargic implementation of regional trade 
agreements. Operating with such consciousness, I argue, engenders a better 
understanding of the intrigues of the implementation phase, as opposed to the 
narrow, lack of political will arguments. I conclude the chapter in section 6. 
2 OVERVIEW OF THE AFCFTA
The AfCFTA is the latest layer of agreement in Africa’s over half a century 
experimentation with regional economic cooperation. Historically, the 
AfCFTA builds on the aspirations of pan-Africanists and their visions for an 
economically independent Africa. More recently, the AfCFTA constitutes one 
of the goals on the continuum towards an African Economic Community, as 
envisaged by the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (the 
Abuja Treaty).5 The achievement of the African Economic Community was 
premised on the eight recognised RECs. Notably, at the heart of the AfCFTA 
is the imperative of Africa’s industrialisation by building on sub-regional 
economic integration. Thus, the AfCFTA is not a standalone project. It is 
5 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, Organization of African Unity, 
3 June 1991, Abuja, Nigeria https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37636-treaty-0016_-_
treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_e.pdf; see generally Oppong R 
‘The African Union, the African Economic Community and Africa’s Regional Economic 
Communities: Untangling a Complex Web’ (2010) 18 African Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 92–103 92.
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anchored and complementary to other African Union (AU) initiatives for the 
continent’s economic integration and development. 
The AfCFTA is also connected with the AU’s Agenda 2063 as its first flagship 
and a foundation on which to build Africa’s progress for the attainment of 
the Sustainable Development Goals. Together with the Boosting Intra-African 
Trade (BIAT) Action Plan, African leaders hope that the AfCFTA will address 
the bottlenecks of intra-African trade by focusing on seven thematic areas: 
trade policy reform, trade facilitation, productive capacity, trade-related 
infrastructure, trade finance, trade information and factor market integration. 
In this context, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) views the BIAT as a crucial policy for ‘minimizing the challenges 
and maximising the gains of tariff and services liberalization’ so that African 
states can harness the promise of the AfCFTA.6
The AfCFTA entered into force in May 2019 when the threshold for 
operationalising the agreement was reached.7 Of the 55 AU members, 54 have 
signed the AfCFTA8 and, by January 2021, 34 members had deposited the 
instruments of ratification with the AU Commission. At the 2019 Niamey 
Summit, African leaders launched five complementary initiatives that will 
support the implementation of the AfCFTA.9 Trading under the AfCFTA, 
6 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Digital Trade in Africa: Implications 
for Inclusion and Human Rights (2017) https://www.uneca.org/archive/sites/default/
files/PublicationFiles/dthr_en_full_rev3.pdf 12.
7 See generally Luke D & MacLeod J ‘Bringing About Inclusive Trade in Africa with the 
African Continental Free Trade Area’ in Luke D & MacLeod J (eds) Inclusive Trade 
in Africa: The Africa Continental Free Trade in Comparative Perspective (2019) 1–4; 
Gathii J ‘Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area’ (2019) 58 
International Legal Materials 1028–1083; and AU & UNECA ‘African Continental 
Free Trade Area, Updated Questions & Answers’ (January 2020) https://repository.
uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/43253/b11975106.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
8 Eritrea is the only country that has not signed the AfCFTA.
9 These are the AfCFTA product-specific rules of origin covering 90 per cent of tariff 
lines; the Continental Online Mechanism for Monitoring, Reporting and Eliminating 
Non-Tariff Barriers; the Pan-African Payments and Settlements System; the Online 
Portal for Trade in Goods Tariffs Negotiations; and the AU Trade Observatory. 
Addressing the summit, Afreximbank’s president Benedict Oramah said: ‘The PAPSS is 
a platform that will domesticate intra-regional payments, save the continent more than 
US$5bn in payment transaction costs per annum, formalise a significant proportion of 
the estimated US$50bn of informal intra-African trade, and above all, contribute in 
boosting intra-African trade’ (Wass S ‘Africa’s Continent-wide Payment and Settlement 
System Launched’ (9 July 2019) Global Trade Review https://www.gtreview.com/news/
Africa/africas-continent-wide-payment-and-settlement-system-launched/).
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which was initially scheduled to commence on 1 July 2020, was post-
poned to 1 January 2021 because of the disruptions occasioned by the 
COVID-19 pandemic.10
The AfCFTA has a wide scope. It covers trade in goods and services, 
investment, intellectual property rights and competition policy. The AfCFTA 
has general and specific objectives. The general objectives are, inter alia, the 
creation of a single market for goods, services, and the movement of persons 
and investments among African countries; the creation of a liberalised market 
for goods and services based on successive rounds of negotiations; laying 
the foundation for the establishment of a Continental Customs Union; and 
enhancing the competitiveness of the economies of African states, both 
within the continent and the global market.11 Moreover, the AfCFTA aspires 
towards a better coordination of African trade regimes and the elimination of 
challenges associated with multiple and overlapping trade agreements across 
the continent.12 The general objectives of the agreement also include socio-
economic development, gender equality and structural transformation of the 
State Parties.13 
The specific objectives mandate the parties to progressively eliminate 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade in goods and liberalise trade 
in services.14 State Parties shall cooperate on investment, intellectual property 
10 See AU ‘Africa is Open for Business, Based on a Single Rule-Book for Trade and 
Investment’ (9 September 2020) https://au.int/ar/node/39287; UNECA ‘African Union 
Approves Start of Trading Under AfCFTA on 1 January Next Year as Earlier Agreed’ 
(5 December 2020) https://www.uneca.org/storys/african-union-approves-start-tra 
ding-under-afcfta-1-january-next-year-earlier-agreed. 
11 Article 3(h) of the AfCFTA provides that the general objectives of the AfCFTA include 
the resolution of ‘the challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships and expedite 
the regional and continental integration processes’. 
12 See generally Gathii J ‘African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes’ 
(2009) 35 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 
571–666; Busch M ‘Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement 
in International Trade’ (2007) 61 (4) International Organization 735–761.
13 See Art 3(e) of the AfCFTA; on gender and gendering in regional economic integration 
in Africa, see generally Gammage C & Momodu M ‘The Economic Empowerment of 
Women in Africa: Regional Approaches to Gender Sensitive Trade Policies’ (2020) 1 
African Journal of International Economic Law 1–40.
14 See Arts 4(a) and (b) of the AfCFTA; see also Simo R ‘Trade in Services in the African 
Continental Free Trade Area: Prospects, Challenges and WTO Compatibility’ (2020) 23 
(1) Journal of International Economic Law 65–95 (discussing the contribution of the 
Protocol in Trade and Services in the achievement of an African Economic Community, 
introducing the importance of services in both the developing and developed world and 
justifying their inclusion in modern trade agreements like the AfCFTA).
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rights and competition policy,15 and establish a mechanism for the settlement of 
disputes concerning their rights and obligations.16 The State Parties shall also 
maintain an institutional framework for the implementation and administration 
of the AfCFTA.17 
While the objectives of the AfCFTA are clearly specified, the means by which 
they will be achieved are unclear. Major prerequisites for trade liberalisation, 
such as specific agreement on the products for which tariffs are to be reduced, 
how far to reduce, and when to do so, as well as the rules of origin, are 
yet to be finalised. The negotiation and agreement on the rules of origin in 
particular is a sine qua non for any free trade agreement. Lack of agreed rules 
of origin creates a loophole that third-country producers may exploit.18 The 
outcome of the ongoing negotiations is therefore critical to the future of the 
AfCFTA and its objectives.
3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFCFTA 
Although institutions of RECs in Africa are marked by a wide array of diversity, 
a common thread that connects them all is their lacklustre performance. 
Weak and ineffective institutions have been a challenge in regional economic 
15 See Art 4(c) of the AfCFTA; see generally Büthe T & Kigwiru VK ‘The Spread of 
Competition Law and Policy in Africa’ (2020) 1 African Journal of International 
Economic Law 41–83 (taking stock of the status of competition laws and agencies at 
the national and regional level in Africa by providing an overview of the history and 
current state of competition law and policy); Adebola T ‘Mapping Africa’s Complex 
Regimes: Towards an African Centred AfCFTA Intellectual Property (IP) Protocol’ 
(2020) 1 African Journal of International Economic Law 233–290 (comprehensively 
mapping and analysing the fragmented intellectual property (IP) architecture in Africa 
in light of the pending AfCFTA IP Protocol and arguing that it presents a timely, albeit 
arduous, opportunity for Africa to reconstruct its broken IP architecture).
16 See Art 4(f) of the AfCFTA; see generally Akinkugbe OD ‘Dispute Settlement Under 
the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: A Preliminary Assessment’ 
(2019) 28 (supplement) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 
138–158 (examining the challenges of operationalising the AfCFTA’s dispute settlement 
mechanism in the context of discontent with similar WTO-styled DSM in African 
regional economic communities and international arbitration at the national level).
17 See Art 4(g) of the AfCFTA.
18 See UNCTAD Economic Development in Africa Report: Made in Africa – Rules of 
Origin for Enhanced Intra-Africa Trade (26 June 2019) https://unctad.org/system/files/
official-document/aldcafrica2019_en.pdf. The edition focuses on the role of preferential 
rules of origin in shaping the development of regional value chains in the AfCFTA with 
a view to maximising gains from the area for structural transformation.
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integration. Trade agreements require effective institutions to oversee, promote 
and monitor the implementation of obligations by their members. Effective 
institutions are important drivers of a successful trade agreement.19
The institutional framework for the implementation, administration, 
facilitation, monitoring and evaluation of the AfCFTA consists of the Assembly, 
the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Senior Trade Officials and the 
Secretariat.20 The Assembly of the AU is the highest decision-making organ.21 
It provides oversight and strategic guidance on the AfCFTA, as well as BIAT. 
The Assembly has exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the AfCFTA 
on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers.22 The ‘involvement of the 
Assembly ensures that the AfCFTA’s institutions are firmly within the circuit of, 
and aligned with, the [AU] institutions under the supervision of the Assembly’.23 
The Council of Ministers is mandated to ensure the effective implementation 
and enforcement of the agreement and, where necessary, take measures to 
promote the objectives of the AfCFTA and associated instruments.24 The 
Council of Ministers will also collaborate with the relevant organs and 
institutions of the AU and promote the harmonisation of appropriate policies, 
strategies and measures for the effective implementation of the AfCFTA.25 
Article 11.5 of the AfCFTA provides that the decisions taken by the Council 
of Ministers, while acting within its mandate, are binding on the parties. The 
decisions that have legal, structural or financial implications become binding 
upon their adoption by the Assembly.26 
The Secretariat of the AfCFTA will be a functionally autonomous 
institutional body within the AU system with an independent legal personality.27 
The roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat shall be determined by the 
19 See generally Kufuor KO The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community 
of West African States (2006); and Steger D ‘Institutions for Regulatory Cooperation 
in “New Generation” Economic and Trade Agreements’ (2012) 38 (4) Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration 109–126.
20 Arts 9 and 12 of the AfCFTA expatiate of the composition and mandate of the Committee 
of Senior Trade Officials. The Committee consists of Permanent or Principal Secretaries 
or other officials designated by each State Party.
21 See Art 10(1) of the AfCFTA.
22 See Art 10(2) of the AfCFTA.
23 Sodipo B ‘Governance for an Effective AfCFTA’ in Luke & MacLeod (2019) (n 7) 
120–133 120 121.
24 See Art 11(3)(a), (b) and (c) of the AfCFTA.
25 See Art 11(3)(d) and (e) of the AfCFTA.
26 See Art 11(5) of the AfCFTA.
27 See Art 13(3) of the AfCFTA.
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Council of Ministers of Trade.28 In February 2020, at the AU’s 33rd Ordinary 
Session, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government elected its 
inaugural Secretary-General, Mr Wamkele Mene.29 The Secretary-General is 
expected to provide leadership and technical support to the AfCFTA Secretariat 
and overall management of the day-to-day functioning of the Secretariat. 
Moreover, the Secretary-General will be responsible for the implementation of 
the AfCFTA, including strategic collaborations, stakeholder engagement and 
resource mobilisation.30 The headquarters of the AfCFTA Secretariat are in 
Accra, Ghana.
Outside of the governance mechanism, the Protocol on Dispute Settlement 
provides the process and procedure for the settlement of disputes concerning 
the rights and obligations of the parties to the AfCFTA.31 This dispute settle-
ment mechanism is modelled on that of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
with the promise of certainty, predictability and a rules-based regime. Africa, 
however, has various formal dispute settlement institutions existing in sub-
regional communities. These existing structures include mediation or adversarial 
institutions, such as courts or tribunals. The challenge with these sub-regional 
dispute settlement institutions is that African states hardly resort to them for 
the settlement of disputes.32 The question therefore is whether the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the AfCFTA will be relevant for African states.33 
The single market economy aspirations of the AfCFTA will not be achieved 
without effectively strengthening the RECs that constitute its pillars.34 A 
nagging challenge with the institutions of the existing RECs in Africa is that 
they lack supranational powers as they have largely been intergovernmental 
institutions, unlike their counterparts in Europe. Supranational authorities are 
28 See Art 13(6) of the AfCFTA. 
29 See AU ‘Newly Sworn-In AfCFTA Secretary General, Wamkele Mene, Undertakes 
to Serve Africa with Resolute Determination’ (18 April 2020) https://au.int/en/
pressreleases/20200418/newly-sworn-afcfta-secretary-general-wamkele-mene-
undertakes-serve-africa.
30 AU (2020) (n 29).
31 See Art 20(1)–(3) of the AfCFTA.
32 See generally Akinkugbe OD ‘Dispute Settlement Under the African Continental Free 
Trade Area Agreement: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2019) 28 (supplement) African 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 138–158. 
33 See generally Maluwa T ‘The Peaceful Settlement of Dispute Among African States, 
1963–1983: Some Conceptual Issues and Practical Trends’ (1989) 32 (2) International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly 299–320.
34 See generally Bisong A ‘ECOWAS and the Role of the RECs in AfCFTA Implementation’ 
(2020) 9 (1) Great Insights 23–24.
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distinguished by their autonomy in decision making (in particular the rule of 
the voting majority as opposed to consensus), the superiority of regional laws 
and preclusion of members from enacting contradictory laws, ‘the institutional 
autonomy of an organisation from its member states, and the direct binding 
effect of laws emanating from regional organisations on natural and legal 
persons in member states’.35 The lack of supranational authority, particularly 
with respect to the consensus decision-making process, is an impediment to 
the implementation of trade and integration commitments of the AfCFTA. The 
experience of African states so far has shown that the majoritarian approach 
would be a more progressive route. 
Seeking the appropriate balance between African countries’ sovereignty to 
adopt economic policies in the interest of their nations, and the powers the 
AfCFTA institutions require to operate in an effective and efficient manner 
is central to the single community and overall economic and sustainable 
development aspirations of the AfCFTA. One thing is clear: institutions matter. 
The new institutions of the AfCFTA add to the spaghetti bowl of institutions 
under the various RECs. It is too early to say whether these institutions will be 
different in terms of charting a new course for trade liberalisation in Africa. 
However, creating a convergence between the informal norms of African 
regional economic integration and the formal rules will be critical to the 
effectiveness of the institutions and therefore the AfCFTA. The formal rules 
of trade institutions should be designed to achieve socially inclusive outcomes. 
Likewise, they should address the trade concerns of the powerful and less 
economically powerful members of the group alike. Whereas the design of 
trade agreements tends to serve the interests of those with the bargaining 
power to create new rules, in the African context, balancing the interests and 
development of less economically endowed members is critical.36
The AfCFTA envisions a rules-based trade liberalisation regime with a view 
to creating a single market economy. Yet, the experience of the practices of 
its members differs significantly. The general notion that law has prominence 
35 Fagbayibo B ‘Common Problems Affecting Supranational Attempts in Africa: An Analytical 
Overview’ (2013) 16 (1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse 
Elek troniese Regsblad 31–69 33; see generally Fagbayibo B ‘Looking Back, Thinking 
Forward: Understanding the Feasibility of Normative Supranationalism in the African 
Union’ (2013) 20 (3) South African Journal of International Affairs 411–442.
36 See generally Drahos P ‘When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the 
World Trade Organization’ (2003) 8 (1) International Negotiation 79–109; and Crystal J 
‘Bargaining in the Negotiations over Liberalizing Trade in Services: Power, Reciprocity 
and Learning’ (2003) 10 (3) Review of International Political Economy 552–578. 
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over politics in the implementation phase of trade agreements has not been 
true for African countries. The effectiveness of the AfCFTA institutions, 
and by extension its single market economy aspiration, is dependent on the 
convergence and alignment of the informal aspects of African regional economic 
integration and the formal architecture enunciated in the AfCFTA. Wholesale 
transplantation of the design of institutions of integration regimes from the 
WTO is bound only to reinforce the ineffectiveness of African regional trade 
regimes.37 Therefore, variations that take account of local peculiarities in the 
implementation of the legal institutions are important.
The formal rules of economic integration as enshrined in the AfCFTA and 
the protocols are legitimised in practice only if the informal norms of African 
economic integration are strategically empowered and aligned with the formal 
approach. In other words, for the institutions of the AfCFTA, such as the 
dispute settlement mechanism, to be effective, African leaders have to confront 
and change the course of the divergence that has characterised the practice of 
African economic integration. 
The dream of an Africa We Want and a single market economy pursuant 
to the AfCFTA is realistic only to the extent that each participating member 
commits to a timely and effective enforcement of the rules and meaningful 
support for the work of the institutions of the AfCFTA. As Kufuor notes, 
formal and informal constraints interact to shape organisational paths. Once 
on a given institutional path, an organisation’s decision-makers and interests 
obtain advantage from the ‘increasing returns to the institutional matrix’ 
and, as a consequence institutions will endure notwithstanding whether they 
are efficient or inefficient and even if there is an alternative path for the 
organisation that is demonstrably more efficient.38 
In other words, there is a complex interaction between formal and informal 
norms and rules of the behaviour of African states when it comes to regional 
economic integration. Hence, understanding when and how informal norms of 
African regional economic integration can reinforce formal institutions, and 
vice versa, will be paramount to the success and effectiveness of the AfCFTA 
in liberalising trade in Africa.39 
37 See generally Naldi J & Magliveras K ‘The African Economic Community: Emancipation 
for African States or Yet Another Glorious Failure’ (1998) 24 (3) North Carolina 
Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulations 601–631.
38 Kufuor K The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West 
African States (2006) 35. 
39 See generally Acemoglu D & Johnson S ‘Unbundling Institutions’ (2005) 113 (5) Journal 
of Political Economy 949–995.
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4 THE AFCFTA’S IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SHADOW OF 
AFRICA’S MIXED RECORD OF REGIONAL TRADE REGIME
The implementation of the AfCFTA lies in the shadow of Africa’s mixed 
record of economic cooperation. The choice of a mixed record as opposed to 
failed regime is deliberate. Regionalism in Africa has both economic and non-
economic dimensions. It is a notorious fact that economic integration among 
African states has been slow. Non-economic cooperation has however been more 
successful. Failure narratives of African regional trade agreements do not make 
these distinctions. The distinction is important because unnuanced assessments 
of the performance of African regional trade agreements inadvertently affirm 
the universality of the European Union approaches.40 African trade regimes 
are heterogeneous and constituted by formal and informal economies with 
a multidimensional economic and non-economic focus.41 Hence, I opt for 
a nuanced understanding rather than universalising the failure of the trade 
regimes. Accordingly, the mixed narrative acknowledges the modest progress 
that sub-regional economic organisations have achieved.42 
As previously highlighted, the promise of a single economic community 
under the AfCFTA hinges on the RECs as its building blocks. Eight RECs 
are recognised by the AU: the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
SAD);43 the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU);44 the Intergovernmental Authority 
40 For an analysis of the case for reconceptualising failure narratives in African court 
regimes, see generally Akinkugbe OD ‘Revisiting the Economic Community of 
West African States: A Socio-Legal Analysis’ (20 December 2017) Doctoral Thesis, 
University of Ottawa https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3354070; 
and Gathii J African Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (2011).
41 See Akinkugbe OD ‘Theorizing Developmental Regionalism in Narratives of African 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)’ (2020) 1 African Journal of International 
Economic Law 293–320 297. 
42 See Ndomo A ‘Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progressive Overview’ 
(May 2009) TRALAC 5 https://www.tralac.org/images/News/Reports/Regional_
Economic_Communities_ in_Africa_A_Progress_Overview_Atieno_Ndomo_
GTZ_2009.pdf, arguing that ‘in terms of progress made in advancing the goals of 
regional integration, the results are mixed with a general sense that there remain 
substantial gaps in achievements. Although some RECs have made strides towards free 
trade and a customs union, progress towards harmonised and integrated sub regional 
markets is slow’.
43 Community of Sahel-Saharan States Revised Treaty, 16 February 2013 https://www.
nepad.org/file-download/download/public/14488.
44 Treaty Instituting the Arab Maghreb Union, 29 September 1989 https://www.wipo.int/
edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/amu/trt_amu.pdf.
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on Development (IGAD);45 the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC);46 the East African Community (EAC);47 the Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECCAS);48 the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA);49 and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS).50 SADC, EAC, ECCAS and COMESA, for instance, have 
pursued different trade programmes within their regional blocs. Therefore, 
they are at different stages of economic integration. Some of the obstacles that 
are common to the RECs in their pursuit of an effective intra-regional trade 
integration include policies that are informed by national interests, geo-political 
contests and social conflicts, slow progress on the removal of NTBs, half-
hearted commitment to the freedom of movement of persons and goods across 
regional borders, ill-attention to the plight of informal cross-border trade, and 
an underdeveloped infrastructure that amplifies the costs of intra-regional 
trade. The reasons that the economic gains have not translated into substantive 
growth are colonial and post-colonial in nature. They are colonial in the sense 
that African states were created into a structure of international economic 
inequality that pauperise their economic endowments through economic policy 
measures adopted in the global economic regime. For example, the position of 
many African states mainly as commodities suppliers and as highly vulnerable 
to fluctuations in international markets has contributed to the affirmation 
of global patterns of inequality.51 In the post-colonial era, while the unequal 
economic structure remains, physical infrastructure challenges, ineffective 
trade policies at the regional level, and the lack of political will among African 
leaders have contributed to the poor economic performance of the formal 
45 Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, 
21 March 1996 http://www.kenyalaw.org.
46 Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 
21 October 2015 https://www.sadc.int/files/5314/4559/5701/Consolidated_Text_of_
the_SADC_Treaty_-_scanned_21_October_2015.pdf. 
47 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 1999 https://www.eacj.
org/?page_id=33.
48 Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States, October 1983 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/eccas/trt_eccas.pdf.
49 Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 1993 https://
www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Comesa-Treaty.pdf.
50 Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, 24 July 1993 
https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-law/treaties/. 
51 See generally Deaton A ‘Commodity Prices and Growth in Africa’ (1999) 13 (3) Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 23–40.
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regional trade regimes. With these challenges continuing unabated, trading 
with states outside Africa has thrived to the detriment of intra-regional trade.
Furthermore, the experience in sub-regional organisations reveals that 
African states prioritise national economic development policies over regional 
ones. Regional trade policies are frequently subverted by a combination of the 
slow or incomplete domestication of regional commitments. The delay in the 
ratification of the AfCFTA by the parliaments of some African states illustrates 
this problem.52 However, while the enthusiasm about the coming into force 
of the AfCFTA has been encouraging, navigating an accelerated economic 
integration agenda that centres Africa’s interests presents more formidable 
political, economic, legal and functional/institutional challenges.53 
In this regard, the AfCFTA’s proposal to build on the RECs without providing 
a specific plan of how to do so is at best murky and aspirational. Disentangling 
the complex web of RECs in Africa for the implementation of the AfCFTA 
is critical to the success of the agreement. It is not enough that the AfCFTA 
proposes to build on the acquis of the RECs. The lack of trust and colonial 
divisions between Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone countries will 
simply be extended into the AfCFTA’s implementation process. A possibility that 
may ensue is a reproduction of the impediments that the RECs have experienced. 
The increasing number of scholarly assessments of the AfCFTA promise 
are both optimistic and sceptical. On paper, both optimists and sceptics 
recognise the promise of the AfCFTA to transform the economic development 
struggles of African states in pursuit of a meaningful and substantive 
industrialisation agenda. 
The optimistic view is championed mostly by institutional actors and 
representatives. For understandable reasons, they touted the win-win nature 
of the agreement. However, the extent to which a trade agreement equalises 
the relationship of the participating states is questionable. The African states 
comprise developing and least-developed countries (LDCs). The likelihood that 
52 Nigeria, among a bouquet of other countries, would have missed the official 
commencement trading date of 1 July 2020, but for the postponement due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic (see Adegboyega A ‘Nigeria Set to Ratify AfCFTA Agreement 
– Minister’ (22 September 2020) Premium Times https://www.premiumtimesng.com/
business/416280-nigeria-set-to-ratify-afcfta-agreement-minister.html.
53 See UNCTAD African Continental Free Trade Area: Advancing Pan-African Integration 
– Some Considerations UNCTAD/WEB/DITC/2016/5 (2016) 1–21 https://unctad.org/
webflyer/african-continental-free-trade-area-advancing-pan-african-integration-some-
considerations (providing an overview of the opportunities and challenges for African 
continental economic integration through the AfCFTA).
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the AfCFTA will benefit the more economically endowed members is high. Luke 
and MacLeod argue that the ‘AfCFTA is win-win for all African countries’.54 
Their argument is predicated on the flexibility and variable geometry principles 
of the AfCFTA. In Luke and MacLeod’s view, industrialised African countries 
will gain from the opportunities for manufactured products, while the less-
industrialised countries can derive their benefit from linking to the regional 
value chains.55 Agricultural producing countries will gain from producing food 
for Africa’s food security, while the benefits arising from reduced tariffs, trade 
facilitation and customs cooperation should alleviate the predicament of land-
locked African states. The LDCs can take advantage of programmes such as 
the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa56 and educational and skills 
training courses to address their concerns.57 The challenge, however, is that the 
RECs have not been able to translate these flexibilities into substantive intra-
African trade and economic development. 
The sceptics, however, diverge on the substantive capacity of the AfCFTA to 
achieve the goals without addressing, at least simultaneously, some of the urgent 
pre-existing impediments. Critics of the AfCFTA argue that the perennial 
challenges of regional trade agreements and cooperation in Africa must be 
addressed for its promise to be realised. Ajibo argues that to optimise effective 
trading in goods and services, the AfCFTA will need to address deficiencies in 
technical capacity, financial resources, physical infrastructure, the elimination 
of non-tariff measures, and will have to create a reliable remedies regime.58 More 
pointedly, in assessing the promise of the AfCFTA to address the plight of the 
LDCs in Africa, Ndonga, Laryea and Chaponda contend that the AfCFTA ‘does 
not and cannot address many other problems that beset African international 
trade performances, such as poor infrastructure and low production and 
productivity’.59 They argue that, to maximise the potential of the AfCFTA, 
54 Luke & MacLeod (2019) (n 7) 1 10. 
55 See Luke & MacLeod (2019) (n 7).
56 See Action Plan for the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa, Ex.CL/379 (XII) 
Annex II, AU https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/documents/30985-doc-plan_
of_action_of_aida.pdf. 
57 See Luke & Macleod (2019) (n 7) 1 10.
58 See Ajibo (2019) (n 3) 873. 
59 Ndonga D, Laryea E & Chaponda M ‘Assessing the Potential Impact of the African 
Continental Free Trade Area on Least Developed Countries: A Case Study of Malawi’ 
(2020) 46 (4) Journal of Southern African Studies 773–792 779 (analysing questions 
such as whether the AfCFTA trade benefits will accrue evenly to Africa’s diverse 
economies and how the agreement’s provisions will affect the economies that have a 
fiscal dependence on trade taxes).
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African states must pivot from patterns of trading and national economic 
policies, and invest in physical infrastructure that opens up new opportunities 
for Africa. Likewise, extant physical infrastructures, particularly the road and 
rail routes of trading, entrench colonial trading patterns. To a limited extent, the 
regional development corridor projects that some of the RECs have implemented 
are aimed at addressing this challenge. However, the geographical spread of 
the programmes requires a wider expansion. Obegon-Odoom, also a sceptic, 
argues that the AfCFTA lacks the capacity to re-engineer a redistribution of 
private legal and economic ordering.60 His scepticism stems from the fact that 
the AfCFTA shows ‘little concern with staggering inequality and debt crises on 
the continent, and [despite its attention to economic growth and development, 
the AFCFTA] … may contribute to impending ecological crises’.61 
In other words, in its current form, the AfCFTA does not adequately 
address how the inequality and distributional effects, particularly as they 
relate to the informal economy and LDCs, will be addressed. If the gains are 
perceived as being captured by only a few countries, there may be a backlash 
for the AfCFTA in the implementation phase. Article 5 of AfCFTA, inter alia, 
incorporates principles such as variable geometry,62 flexibility and special and 
differential treatment (S&DT), and the preservation of the acquis.63 Flexibility, 
S&DT and variable geometry are embedded in the AfCFTA.64 In my view, 
while these principles are useful and might address some challenges relating to 
different levels of development, African leaders need to pay far more attention 
to the plight of the most vulnerable African states. Development-centred 
projects that will augment and enhance the job security of the women and men 
60 Obeng‐Odom (2020) (n 3) 168; Udombana NJ ‘A Step Closer: Economic Integration and 
the African Continental Free Trade Area’ (2020) 31 (1) Duke Journal of Comparative 
& International Law 1–89.
61 Obeng‐Odom (2020) (n 3) 168. 
62 For different takes on the contentious implication of this principle for African 
economic integration, see Tino E ‘The Variable Geometry in the Experience of 
Regional Organizations in Developing Countries’ (2013-2014) 18 Spanish Yearbook of 
International Law 141–162; and Gathii (2011) (n 40).
63 See Gérout G, MacLeod J & Desta M ‘The AfCFTA As Yet Another Experiment 
Towards Continental Integration: Retrospect and Prospect’ in Luke & MacLeod (2019) 
(n 7) 15–34 26; Sommer L & McLeod J ‘How Important is Special and Differential 
Treatment for an Inclusive AfCFTA’ in Luke & MacLeod (2019) (n 7) 69–86; and 
Kuhlmann K & Agutu A ‘The African Continental Free Trade Area: Toward a New 
Legal Model for Trade and Development’ (2020) 51 (4) Georgetown Journal of Inter-
national Law.
64 See Art 5 of the AfCFTA.
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that operate in the informal cross-border trade in Africa must be prioritised. 
More precisely, to drive the implementation of the AfCFTA, it is critical to 
align national interests with regional objectives. In this context, it is essential 
to gain the trust and buy-in of the majority of the parties in negotiations on 
NTBs, rules of origin, investment, cross-border movement of persons, services 
liberalisation and regulation, and trade remedies. We should not conflate the 
overwhelming support for the adoption and coming into force of the AfCFTA 
with its implementation. The real challenge that the promise of a rules-based 
liberalised trade regime under the AfCFTA will have to surmount is African 
states’ implementation lethargy. As it stands, without addressing this as a 
preliminary step to the other challenges discussed in this section, the AfCFTA 
may not transcend the shadow of the RECs. 
5 SYSTEMIC DEFICIENCIES AND THE AFCFTA IN THE 
POST-PANDEMIC ERA 
On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared 
COVID-19 a pandemic, formally signalling its threat to every country in the 
world.65 COVID-19 has revealed the fragility of African states in the global 
economic order. The pandemic and the responses to it by states have brought 
into sharp focus different dimensions of the socio-political and economic 
realities of regional economic cooperation in Africa and vis-à-vis the multilateral 
trading system. It has revealed different dimensions of Africa’s international 
economic relations, both in the context of its South-South relations on the 
one hand, and the Global North on the other. Unlike their Global North-
Global South partnerships, South-South cooperation, on the face of it, builds 
on solidarity, trust and reciprocity. These underlying principles are not without 
their own challenges. Economic cooperation between Global South countries 
also manifests structural inequalities. The COVID-19 pandemic has further 
exacerbated these structural inequalities and power asymmetry.66 
65 See World Health Organization ‘WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the 
Media Briefing on COVID-19’ (11 March 2020) https://www.who.int/director-general/
speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-
covid-19---11-march-2020 (‘COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic’).
66 See Akinkugbe OD & Gammage C ‘COVID-19 and South-South Trade & Investment 
Cooperation: Three Emerging Narratives’ (11 May 2020) Afronomicslaw https://
www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/05/11/covid-19-and-south-south-trade-investment-
cooperation-three-emerging-narratives/, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic could 
generate three narratives: ‘The first narrative is pessimistic in its outlook – the “worst 
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Africa was already in a weak and vulnerable position in the international 
economic regime before the COVID-19 pandemic. The vulnerability status of 
the marginalised African states in international economic law is not simply 
a consequence of this pandemic.67 It was and is a question of the historical 
inequality, structure of dominance, power asymmetry and its reproduction in 
the international economic law regime that is skewed in favour of the Global 
North. Thus, as Africa has always been at the periphery of the international 
economic order, the pandemic has ‘brought to the fore and made more realistic, 
and quite unfortunately, the plight of the marginalized [African states] in our 
largely unequal multilateral trading regime’.68 Specifically, the pandemic has 
led to a slowdown in trade, investment inflows, tourism and service sectors in 
Africa’s fragile economies. It has left, in its wake, financial distress and rising 
debt, a breakdown in social services, the erosion of trust, the rise of protectionist 
measures, and deepened inequality and vulnerability. In addition to the 
challenges caused by a sharp decline in external trade and investment due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, many African states plunged into an unforeseen socio-
economic crisis resulting from the lockdowns enforced by their governments.69 
At the regional level, the pandemic has slowed the pace of the AfCFTA’s 
operational phase. It led to the postponement of the commencement of trading 
from 1 July 2020 to 1 January 2021. The lockdowns affected the ongoing 
negotiations relating to the rules of origin and NTBs that were important 
for the AfCFTA to commence. The pandemic has thus had a direct effect 
on formal economic integration and intra-African trade.70 Likewise, the 
health-related consequences of the pandemic have economic consequences.71 
case” scenario of a post-Covid 19 world that will be characterised by deeper divisions 
and inequalities among and within countries’; ‘the second narrative of South-South 
cooperation is more optimistic in terms of its outcomes’; and ‘the third narrative 
navigating murky terrain where the winners and losers of the post-Covid 19 era are 
difficult to identify’.
67 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‘Trade and Vulnerability’ 
(16 September 2019) UNCTAD Secretariat https://unctad.org/system/files/official-
document/cid48_en.pdf.
68 Akinkugbe & Gammage (2020) (n 66).
69 The WTO projected a decline in world trade between 13 per cent and 32 per cent in 
2020; see WTO ‘PRESS/855’ (2020) https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/
pr855_e.htm.
70 See Gondwe G ‘Assessing the Impact of COVID-19 on Africa’s Economic Development’ 
(2020) 3 UNCTAD/ALDC/MISC/2020/3 https://unctad.org/system/files/official-docu 
ment/aldcmisc2020d3_en.pdf.
71 See Sirleaf M ‘Africa, COVID-19 and Responsibility’ (12 May 2020) Afronomicslaw 
https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/05/12/africa-covid-19-and-responsibility/.
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Economic measures, particularly border closures, protectionist policies and a 
breakdown in the global and regional supply chain, have produced significant 
setbacks for African economies mainly in terms of lost productivity and trade 
both within and among countries. To illustrate COVID-19’s impact on trade 
in Africa, I use examples of the financial sector-debt burden conundrum and 
digitalisation. The first constitutes an area where historical and contemporary 
deep-seated challenges exist, and the second is an emerging sector that African 
leaders can capitalise on for a better post-pandemic Africa.
Financing Africa’s economy and the problem it has engendered historically 
is a critical aspect of the problems of economic cooperation that the pandemic 
has brought to the fore. In the context of the AfCFTA, the debt profile of many 
African states exposes their weak financial status, as well as their dependency 
on external loans to finance their economies. The debt profile of many African 
states is a significant constraint on their liquidity capacity to implement 
economic measures with a direct impact on trade. From 2011 to 2019, the 
average debt-to-GDP ratio of African states increased from 39,5 per cent to 
61,3 per cent.72 However, African states remained highly indebted. The rise in 
debt has limited the fiscal space to respond adequately to the pandemic due to 
a series of factors that include but are not limited to ‘low domestic saving rates; 
low levels of domestic resource mobilization; high illicit financial outflows; 
capital flight; volatile commodity prices; high fiscal deficits and stagnating 
official developing assistance’.73 Proposals to deal with the attendant debt 
burden for low-income countries include the International Monetary Fund’s 
Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust74 and the Debt Service Suspension 
Initiative 75.76 The proposals are, however, a stop gap that does not address the 
broader systemic issues of inequality and structural asymmetries that created 
72 See UNCTAD Press Release ‘Secretary-General Says Tackling “Crushing Debt” Central 
to COVID-19 Responses, at Joint Meeting of Global Financial Bodies’ (17 April 2020) 
Doc SG/SM/20049 https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm20049.doc.htm.
73 UNECA, AU & African Development Bank Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area 
About: Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII (2020) 17 https://repository.
uneca.org/ds2/stream/?#/documents/6eecec71-b7f3-5f3f-b853-5e9bfae14955/page/1.
74 See International Monetary Fund ‘Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust’ 
(15 April 2020) https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/49/
Catastrophe-Containment-and-Relief-Trust. 
75 See World Bank ‘COVID-19: Debt Service Suspension Initiative’ (21 December 2020) 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-service-suspension-
initiative.
76 See Connelly S, Tassis C, Patricio Fereirra Lima K & Connelly S ‘Staying Claims: Debt 
Moratoria Beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative’ (6 August 2020) Afronomicslaw 
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the initial problem. Bradlow has warned that the current debt arrangement 
has the potential to encourage vultures who may capitalise on this moment 
for profit and therefore entrench the debt problems of African states.77 The 
point here is that Africa’s debt profile amplifies the urgent need for economic 
diversification and eventual transformation. Whilst debt issues linger and are 
being addressed, the AfCFTA as a vehicle for economic transformation must be 
implemented in a manner that diversifies Africa’s mostly monolithic economies. 
Hence, while in a post-pandemic world African states will require a reasonable 
level of flexibility in capital to ensure that they have the necessary finance to 
stabilise their economies, the AfCFTA must be instrumentalised in innovative 
ways to galvanise and reposition these economies for a better future. 
Another consideration is that the pandemic has accelerated the absorption 
of digital solutions, tools and services, and their adaptation for the purposes 
of trade.78 E-commerce is on the rise in Africa, and with it have come new 
opportunities for market expansion and investment in the digital economy. 
Digital economies hold the promise of transformation of trade and services 
in Africa in unique ways that complement and innovatively expand trade in 
Africa. An increasing amount of e-commerce in Africa involves cross-border 
sales and therefore contributes to international trade. Many African countries 
have actively deployed digital technologies to shift to cashless transactions. 
Likely, digital solutions have been used to manage the spread of the pandemic in 
Africa. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the 
use of mobile money in East Africa has helped to reduce the risk of the spread 
while in Ethiopia and Senegal, tech start-ups are using 3D printing to develop 
face shields and ventilator valves.79 The point here is that financial inclusion 
driven by the digital revolution to foster market integration and production 
activities may be achieved at a much lower transaction cost. Similarly, the 
widespread availability of mobile telephone internet portends well for a greater 
number of participants in the digital economy. In particular, farmers have found 
digital platforms useful in boosting agricultural productivity through prompt 
https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/08/06/staying-claims-debt-moratoria-beyond-the-
debt-service-suspension-initiative/.
77 See Bradlow D ‘Dove, Vultures and African Debt in the Time of COVID-19’ (22 May 
2020) Afronomicslaw https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/05/22/doves-vultures-and-
african-debt-in-the-time-of-covid-19/. 
78 See UNECA ‘Impact of COVID-19 in Africa’ (20 May 2020) UNECA Policy Brief 
https://www.uneca.org/archive/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/sg_policy_brief_on_
covid-19_impact_on_africa_may_2020.pdf. 
79 UNECA (2020) (n 78) 8. 
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payments for produce, information sharing and agro-industrial activities.80 In 
the COVID-19 era, the use of technology has become not only increasingly 
important but also the primary means by which smallholder farmers exchange 
information and access to resources.81 Further, the AU has adopted digitisation 
to drive the negotiation of the AfCFTA through the African Virtual Trade-
Diplomacy Platform (AVDP) as part of the wider African Virtual Resilient 
Integration for a Vibrant Africa (AVRIVA).82 To effectively harness digital 
platforms for the AfCFTA, among other emerging digital solutions, the AU 
identifies the following three key interventions: (i) the establishment of a 
pan-African technology platform and digitisation of the bio-surveillance and 
bio-screening protocols of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention; (ii) the design and deployment of a technology framework for 
aligning e-commerce and e-trading platforms; and (iii) a broad initiative to 
enhance cybersecurity in multilateral affairs in Africa.83 
Digitisation is, however, not value-neutral. Digital solutions are adopted 
and applied in an already stratified economy.84 Maximising the full potential 
of the digital revolution requires an acknowledgement of the challenges and 
taking appropriate steps to address them. Digitisation in service of trade and 
integration must be implemented to reflect equitable, inclusive and sustainable 
economic expansion in Africa. In the context of the AfCFTA, Sucker argues 
that the potential to harness the benefits of the digital sector would only be 
80 See Abdulai A, Duncan E & Fraser E ‘How Digital Technologies Can Help Africa’s 
Smallholder Farmers’ (29 July 2019) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations http://www.fao.org/e-agriculture/blog/how-digital-technologies-can-help-
africa’s-smallholder-farmers. In relation to farming, digitisation refers to ‘everything 
from delivering farming advice via text messaging to interactive voice response. It also 
includes smart phone applications that link farmers to multimedia advisory context, 
farm inputs, and buyers. And it covers the use of drones and satellite systems to inform 
farmer activities, such as crops and times to plant; and types and amounts of inputs to 
use’. (Abdulai et al 2019) (n 80)). 
81 See Browner M ‘How Technology Powers Smallholder Farmers During COVID-19’ 
(25 September 2020) Global Citizen https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/how-
technology-powers-smallholder-farmers/. 
82 See AU ‘In Wake of COVID-19, African Union to Keep AfCFTA on Track with Digital 
Technology’ (14 August 2020) https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200814/covid-19-
african-union-keep-afcfta-track-digital-technology.
83 AU (2020) (n 82).
84 See Sucker F ‘COVID-19 Pushes Digital Solutions and Deepens Digital Divides: What 
Role for African Digital Trade Law?’ (9 May 2020) Afronomicslaw https://www.
afronomicslaw.org/2020/05/09/covid-19-pushes-digital-solutions-and-deepens-digital-
divides-what-role-for-african-digital-trade-law/.
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realised if ‘an additional AfCFTA-protocol with specific provisions on cross 
border e-commerce are expanded to focus more broadly on cross border 
digital trade’. Such an approach, Sucker contends, ‘would not only capture 
the sale of consumer products via the Internet and digitally supplied services 
… but also data flows that enable global value chains, services that enable 
smart manufacturing, digital content not stored on a physical carriers … and 
numerous other platforms and applications’.85
While the pandemic may have shown deep and systemic deficiencies and 
vulnerabilities for many African countries, policy lessons can also inform 
future pathways to strengthen the trade regime in Africa. With the promise of 
opportunities for new trade exports, jobs, investments in infrastructure and 
financing for Africa’s development, the AfCFTA has a crucial role to play in 
diversifying African economies and protecting them against future harm or 
volatilities that shape the global commodity prices that constitute the majority 
of Africa’s foreign trade. In other words, the pause in the negotiations for phase 
II of the AfCFTA presents an opportunity for African countries to re-assess 
the potential impact of a prolonged delay and revisit the areas that COVID-19 
has revealed as Africa’s strengths and weaknesses. It is imperative that African 
leaders embrace an unwavering commitment to re-engineer African economies 
through the AfCFTA for a sustainable and relevant industrial future.86 
COVID-19 has reminded us that, in the face of emergencies, national autonomy 
will be reasserted against regional integration objectives. African countries 
are not alone in this realisation.87 We are reminded that international trade is 
not a silver bullet for prosperity and that in the context of the AfCFTA, the 
journey to realising its objectives depends on several layers of socio-political, 
economic, cultural and institutional factors. 
6 CONTENDING VISIONS OF PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE AFCFTA
The AfCFTA has been touted as a pan-African trade agreement. However, 
it remains unclear what this assertion means. Abrahamsen’s analysis of the 
contending visions of the ideology of pan-Africanism offers a compelling fluid, 
85 Sucker (2020) (n 84).
86 See Desta M ‘Covid-19 and Export Restrictions: The Limits of International Trade 
Law and Lessons for the AfCFTA’ (May 2020) Africa Trade Policy Centre, UNECA 
https://repository.uneca.org/ds2/stream/?#/documents/cadd8f0c-cc81-4887-b98a-
5e6b6975b91c/page/1.
87 See Desta (2020) (n 86). 
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overlapping and morphological understanding of pan-Africanism, which is 
instructive to understanding the future of the AfCFTA in the implementation 
phase.88 Therefore, my aim is not to examine the concept in its historical 
evolution. The majority of scholars describe the attitude of African states 
towards non-implementation as a lack of political will. In my view, this 
oversimplifies the movements that occur in the implementation phase.89 
In signalling a pan-Africanist underpinning, the AfCFTA gives an idea 
that a pan-African trade agreement is unifying and perhaps monolithic.90 
Pan-Africanism, Abrahamsen argues, ‘contains internal tensions and fissures, 
multiple variations and inflections, all adapting and mutating in interaction 
with global events’.91 In other words, not only is pan-Africanism not value 
neutral, its meaning at any point in time is constituted by interactions with 
prevailing ideologues in the international economic order. Abrahamsen 
identifies overlapping ideas and building blocks for her analysis of
contending and evolving visions of world order within Pan-Africanism: a 
world of racially defined units; a world of continental unity and transnational 
solidarity; and a world of national sovereignty. 
… 
morphological perspective that recognises Pan-Africanism as capable of 
multiple conceptual combinations and nuanced variations, offering different 
and varied decontestations of unity – depending on how it is conjugated 
in relation to the desire and demand for other political ends, most notably 
sovereignty and equality, and correlated with world events and historical 
circumstances.92 
88 See Abrahamsen R ‘Internationalists, Sovereignties, Nativists: Contending Visions of 
World Order in Pan-Africanism’ (2020) 46 (1) Review of International Studies 56–74 57.
89 See eg Kufuor K ‘When Two Leviathans Clash: Free Movement of Persons in ECOWAS 
and the Ghana Investment Act of 1994’ (2013) 6 (1) African Journal of Legal Studies 
1–16 (analysing the problems that arise in ‘reconciling ECOWAS’ supranationalism 
with the domestic interests of its members that is played out in the on-going bout of 
protectionism currently existing in Ghana, related primarily to the right of Nigerian 
citizens to establish themselves in Ghana’s markets and engage in what is known as 
petty trading’. (Kufuor (2013) 2).
90 See Nanga J ‘The African Continental Free Trade Area: Free Trade and Pan-Africanism’ 
(1 January 2019) Bilaterals https://www.bilaterals.org/?the-african-continental-free-trade.
91 Abrahamsen (2020) (n 88) 57.
92 Abrahamsen (2020) (n 88) 57–58. ‘Pan-Africanism today relates and responds to the ideas 
and forces that give rise to widespread anxieties over a vanishing liberal internationalism, 
including the spread of nationalism, the withdrawal from multilateralism, and the 
emergence of illiberal powers like China and Russia.’ (Abrahamsen (2020) 61).
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My argument here is a simple one: African regional trade regimes in general, 
and the AfCFTA project in particular, have paid insufficient attention to 
the mutability and fluidity of pan-Africanism in the discourses of economic 
cooperation in Africa, especially in the implementation phase of the trade 
agreements. A reasonable body of literature that analyses the AfCFTA as 
a pan-African project tends to equate this loosely with a convergence with 
national economic policies or objectives. To be sure, Pan-Africanism is useful 
and ‘contains valuable intellectual and political resources for the defence, 
reinvigoration, and invention of a more just, rule-bound multilateral world 
order, but that this cannot be taken for granted’.93 
Nigeria’s stop and start relationship offers a good example to illustrate 
the argument that pan-Africanism is fluid and mutable and evolving vis-à-
vis each state party as opposed to a united African states’ position about 
the ideology. In the context of the AfCFTA, having been at the forefront of 
negotiating the AfCFTA, Nigeria’s initial delay in signing the agreement took 
many by surprise. However, at the heart of the decision were national concerns 
championed mostly by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN).94 
The non-competitiveness of small and medium-sized Nigerian companies vis-
a-vis the transnational companies, MAN argues, will inevitably be a factor in 
the bankruptcy of these companies, the consequent job losses and the growth 
of unemployment.95 As such, it was wise to delay the decision to address the 
national contestations regarding the AfCFTA. 
Pan-Africanist ideologies do not abate after the agreement becomes 
operational. Its effect in one form or a combination of the three visions 
described above inform the behaviour of African states in the implementation 
of the AfCFTA. The future of the AfCFTA and its implementation will do 
well recognising that what appears as a lack of political will, in the context of 
an economic objective, may be a manifestation of the underlying contending 
national, sub-regional and regional visions. Perhaps working with such a 
nuanced and critical understanding would engender new attitudes towards the 
underlying challenges for the members. Such an approach, in fact, complements 
the flexibilities that are codified in the AfCFTA.
93 Abrahamsen (2020) (n 88) 73.
94 See Adekoya F ‘MAN Kicks as Nigeria’s Priority Products are Omitted from AfCFTA’s 
Sensitive, Exclusive Lists’ (24 February 2020) The Guardian https://guardian.ng/
business-services/man-kicks-as-nigerias-priority-products-are-omitted-from-afcftas-
sensitive-exclusive-lists/.
95 See Okwumbu R ‘AfCFTA: Nigeria not Ready for Restrictive Rule of Origin’ (30 July 
2020) Nairametrics https://nairametrics.com/2020/07/30/afcfta-nigeria-is-not-ready-
for-restrictive-rule-of-origin/. 
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7 CONCLUSION
The project of trade liberalisation in the context of African societies and 
economic integration cannot be disentangled from the broader question of 
economic development. The implementation of successful trade agreements, 
particularly those with economic development projects embedded in them, 
entails an understanding of the complex socio-political, economic, legal and 
institutional factors at play.96 With trade wars raging in some regions97 and the 
rise of populist and anti-free trade agendas in erstwhile pro-trade countries,98 
confidence in the multilateral trading regime and the architecture of economic 
order it promises has experienced a significant fracture. 
The case has been made extensively for the AfCFTA and its potential to 
restructure international economic law in Africa. To the extent that African leaders 
sought with minimal success for a continental, regional integration scheme, the 
AfCFTA already ticks an important box.99 The recognition of flexible regimes 
via S&DT provisions in acknowledgement of the unequal economic position of 
African states bodes well for an inclusive AfCFTA. Yet, challenges remain. 
An important factor that the policy experts, academics and negotiators of the 
AfCFTA must bear in mind is that its implementation must not be severed from 
the historical, social, economic, political and cultural realities of the continent. 
Even as it aims to construct a new continental economic order, it must not 
only capture the socio-political system that has aided the dominant economic 
actors, but also, extend to the informal economy – consisting mostly of women 
and traders routinely trading across the borders – that strongly underpins 
African societies. The regulation of the formal and informal economies, when 
joined with the potential of the continent in information technology, holds the 
promise of an unprecedented leveraging of capital and resources that bodes 
well for the future of the continent. Lessons and experiences from the RECs 
will be indispensable in this process.
96 See generally Herbst J ‘Crafting Regional Cooperation in Africa’ in Acharya A & 
Johnston A Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative 
perspective (2009) 129–144. 
97 See generally Van Aaken A, Bown C & Lang A ‘Introduction to the Special Issue on 
“Trade Wars”’ (2019) 22 (4) Journal of International Economic Law 529–533.
98 See generally Lester S & Manak I ‘The Rise of Populist Nationalism and the Renegotiation 
of NAFTA’ (2018) 21 (1) Journal of International Economic Law 151–169.
99 On this, see Luke & MacLeod (2019) (n 7) 2: ‘AfCFTA negotiators surpassed expectations 
with the pace with which the negotiations were accomplished … the texts of the AfCFTA 
Agreement and its Protocols on Trade in Goods, Trade in Services and on Rules and 
Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes, were concluded in less than three years’. 
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